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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TOWARDS A THEORY OF ADEQUACY: THE CONTINUING SAGA
OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
TO SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS

DEBORAH A. VERSTEGEN*

I. INTRODUCTION
There is a movement growing across the country on behalf of poor and atrisk children who have been left out and left behind in the realization of an
equal educational opportunity for adequate schooling. It is comparable to past
movements on behalf of linguistic minorities and children with disabilities1
and addresses the twin problems of inequality and inadequacy among school
districts within a state through judicial reform of school finance systems.
Since 1989, high courts in over half of the states have issued rulings on the
constitutionality of their school finance systems. In seventeen states, the state
high court has found the finance system unconstitutional, or a lower court
ruling has gone unchallenged.2 In eleven states the system has been upheld.3
* Deborah A. Verstegen is Professor of Finance and Policy at the University of Virginia, Curry
School of Education.
1. William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8 EDUC. POL’Y
376, 379 (1994), adaption from William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School
Finance, 8 THE WORLD AND I 389 (1993); Deborah A. Verstegen & Terry Whitney, From
Courthouses to Schoolhouses: Emerging Judicial Theories of Adequacy and Equity, 11 EDUC.
POL’Y 330, 352 (1997).
2. States where the finance system has been overturned since 1989 include: Alabama —
Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); Arizona — Roosevelt Elem. Sch.
Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. State, 74
P.3d 258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that school districts did not show current unmet funding
needs related to academeic achievement); Arkansas — Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee,
91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002); Idaho — Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d
913 (Idaho 1998); Kentucky — Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989); Massachusetts — McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.
1993); Missouri — Comm. for Educ. Quality v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1994); Montana —
Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. l v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), modified by Helena Elem.
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); New Hampshire — Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); New Jersey — Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000)
(concluding that preschool programs violated Abbot V requirements); Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d
450 (N.J. 1998) (explaining the remedial measures that must be implemented to meet
499
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Moreover, all recent decisions have been decided on behalf of plaintiffs
representing children in poor schools and districts, and the necessity of extra
assistance for children with special needs is being acknowledged by the
courts.4 Currently, litigation is active in another nineteen states,5 and concern
over the threat of a possible court challenge or the aftershocks of a past
decision affects most of the remaining states.
The new wave of school finance litigation is forcing states to reexamine all
the issues concerning educational equity with which they have previously
dealt, but there are important new directions as well.6 High courts have
examined funding policies for rural schools in Tennessee7 and urban areas in

constitutional standards);
Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) (holding the
Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act of 1996 unconstitutional as applied
to special needs districts); Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) (declaring New Jersey’s
Quality Education Act unconstitutional); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (holding
Public School Education Act of 1975 unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban districts);
Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); New York — Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State,
801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003); North Carolina — Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No.No.
95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686 (N.C. Super. Oct. 12, 2000), discretionay review allowed, Hoke
County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 579 S.E.2d 275 (N.C. 2003); Ohio — DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d
1184 (Ohio 2001) (requiring changes to state’s formula to make its new plan constitutional);
DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) (holding that mandate of the constitution has not
yet been fulfilled); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E. 733 (Ohio 1997); Tennessee — Tennessee Small
Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn. 1995) (holding that the State Basic Education
Program meets constitutional mandates); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d
139 (Tenn. 1993); Texas — Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) (holding that constitutional
violations remained following enactment of new legislation); Vermont — Brigham v. State, 692
A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Wyoming — Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo.
1995).
3. States where the finance system has been upheld since 1989 include: Alaska —
Matanuska-Susima Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997); Illinois — Comm.
for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Kansas — Unified Sch. Dist. 229 v. State,
885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Maine — Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1, v. Comm’r, 659 A.2d 854 (Me.
1994); Minnesota — Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Nebraska — Gould v. Orr,
506 N.W. 349 (Neb. 1993); North Dakota — Bismark Pub. Sch. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247
(N.D. 1994); Oregon — Coalition For Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991);
Rhode Island — Pawtueket v. Sundlan, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Virginia — Scott v.
Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Va. 2000)
(note that a majority of the court overturned the funding system, but a supermajority was
required); Wisconsin — Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wisc. 1989).
4. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 438 (N.J. 1997).
5. Steve Smith, National Center on Education Finance, North Carolina Decision, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/litigationnc.htm.
6. C.f., Deborah A. Verstegen, The New Wave of School Finance Litigation, 76 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 243 (1994); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C.L. REV. 597, 598 n.4 (1994).
7. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232 (Tenn. 2002).
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New Jersey;8 facilities financing in Arizona and Idaho;9 and special education
funding systems in Alabama, Wyoming, and Ohio.10 Preschool has been a
focus of high court decisions in North Carolina and New Jersey, while
assistance for at-risk children or children from low income homes has been
addressed by high courts in New York, North Carolina, New Jersey, Wyoming,
and Wisconsin.11 Overall, however, recent court challenges have incorporated
a new approach, basing their claims on the concept of “educational adequacy”
rather than relying solely on the ideal of education finance equity.
This raises several questions. How do adequacy claims differ from
traditional equity complaints? What is an adequate education, and how is it
defined? Why have some state finance policies been found unconstitutional
while others have been upheld? These questions are addressed in this article.
State high court decisions emerging during the new wave of school finance
litigation are reviewed, and two major findings are discussed: 1) a bifurcated
theory of adequacy emerging from state high courts, and 2) the substantive
contours of an adequate education, which is of interest to courts as a means to
determine whether resources are sufficient in all districts to meet state statutes
and standards consistent with the federal Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND: ADEQUACY VERSUS EQUITY
Finance equity has been a chief concern of the courts for over thirty-five
years, but the focus on educational adequacy is relatively recent in legal
challenges to state school finance systems, beginning in earnest in 1989 with
rulings in Kentucky, Texas, and Montana.12 Finance equity claims focus
mainly on the disparities in funding between high-wealth and low-wealth
school districts within a state that results from the happenstance of unequal

8. Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985).
9. Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Idaho Schs. for
Equal Educ. Oppurtunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913 (Idaho 1998).
10. See Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. DV-90-883-R, 1993 WL 204083
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 738-39 (Ohio 1997). For a
thorough discussion, see Deborah A. Verstegen, New Directions in Special Education Finance
Litigation, 23 J. EDUC. FIN. FIN. 277 (1998).
11. Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997);
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.Y.S.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003); Harrell v. Wilson
County Sch., 293 S.E.2d 687 (N.C. 1982); Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d
106 (N.C. 1980); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); State v. Campbell County Sch.
Dist., 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001).
12. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elem. Sch.
Dist. No. l v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), modified by Helena Elem. Dist. No. 1 v. State,
784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989);
William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on
the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990).
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property tax bases among school districts.13 Remedies typically apply to lowwealth districts only.
The conceptualization and measurement of equity have been well
developed over time and include principles of horizontal equity (equal
treatment of equals), vertical equity (unequal treatment of unequals), and equal
opportunity (wealth neutrality). The conceptualization and measurement of
equity have been set out in a seminal work by Robert Berne and Leanna
Stiefel.14 Their book draws on measures used by economists to evaluate
income inequality.15 Equity measures fall into five conceptual groupings,
including measures of: 1) the extremes in the distribution, 2) all observations,
3) measures of the lower portion of the distribution, 4) other measures (e.g.,
federal range ratio), and 5) measures for the upper portion of the distribution.16
An educational adequacy claim focuses directly on inadequacies in the
level of educational opportunities offered to children and youth in schools and
classrooms within a state. The claim asserts that some students are not
receiving an adequate education as defined by state standards, regulations, or
educational goals consistent with constitutional requirements.17 Thus, an
educational adequacy claim alleges that one or more school districts cannot
provide their students with an adequate education due to insufficient funding.
These claims often seek relief for all districts within a state, rich and poor
alike.18 However, unlike the notion of equity, the conceptualization and
measurement of adequacy in education have received a paucity of attention
until recently.
13. See Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of
School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L.
REV. 543, 545, 571-73 (1998); Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses:
Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 281, 318-19 (1998).
14. See ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL
FINANCE: CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS (1984).
15. See id. at xvi-xvii, 1-6.
16. Deborah A. Verstegen, The Assessment of Equal Educational Opportunity:
Methodological Advances and Multiple State Analyses, in OPTIMIZING EDUCATION RESOURCES,
127, 139 (B.S. Cooper & S.T. Speakman eds., 1996). See also Deborah A. Verstegen, Concepts
and Measures of Fiscal Inequality: A New Approach and Effects for Five States, 22 J. EDUC. FIN.
145 (1996).
17. See WEST ED. ORG, SCHOOL FUNDING POLICY BRIEF: FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY 2
(2000); Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy and the Courts: The
Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN
EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 175-208 (Helen F. Ladd et al., eds., 1999);
James W. Guthrie & Richard Rothstein, Enabling “Adequacy” to Achieve Reality: Translating
Adequacy into State School Finance Distribution Arrangements, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN
EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 209-59 (Helen F. Ladd et al., eds., 1999).
18. Rose v. Council of Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (finding the entire education
system unconstitutional, “all of its parts and parcels”).
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Over the past decade or so, the conceptualization and measurement of
adequacy have developed briskly, although their genesis dates several decades
hence.19 The standards-based reform movement established concepts of an
adequate education that are used together with state constitutions and
regulations to determine base funding for schools and districts.20 Four main
methods are generally used for determining the cost of an adequate education:
statistical analysis, costing comprehensive reform models (also called the
evidence based approach), the successful district approach, and the
professional judgment model.21 However, two key approaches are generally
employed to determine the cost of an adequate education in judicial and
legislative deliberations: 1) the successful school district approach, where
districts meeting state standards and goals are examined to determine costs;
and 2) the professional judgment method, where service providers and local
experts define the resource needs and costs of schools and school districts
based on state standards, regulations, and constitutional requirements.22 These
approaches, sometimes combined in practice, yield a cost of education that can
be adjusted for students and districts with special needs, as well as serving as
the basis for state foundation guarantees in state finance policies.23 In many
states, the finance guarantee is based on the availability of funding or politics
rather than the rational determination of the cost of an adequate education. It is
this irrational method of funding a child’s education to which courts
overturning funding systems take umbrage.24 As the Ohio court found in
DeRolph v. State, “The formula amount has no real relation to what it actually
costs to educate a pupil.”25 In DeRolph II, the court reiterated that “education

19. See, e.g., J. Chambers & T. Parrish, The Issue of Adequacy in Financing Public
Education: How Much Is Enough?, Project Report No. 1 82-A19 (Stanford, CA: Institute for
Research on Educational Finance and Governance, 1982). See also Deborah A. Verstegen,
Judicial Analysis During the New Wave of School Finance Litigation: The New Adequacy in
Education, 24 J. EDUC. FIN. 51, 52 (1998).
20. Standards-based reform focuses on reaching a consensus on, and establishing standards
for, what students need to know and be able to do at each grade or developmental level,
EDSOURCE.ORG GLOSSARY, available at http://www.edsource.org/viewglossary.cfm?Term=
standards-based%20reform (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). For a discussion of standards-based
reform, see William S. Koski, Educational Opportunity and Accountability in an Era of
Standards-Based School Reform, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y Rev. 301 (2001).
21. See Deborah A. Verstegen, Financing the New Adequacy: Towards New Models of State
Education Finance Systems that Support Standards Based Reform, 27 J. EDUC. FIN. 749, 768-76
(2002).
22. Id. JOHN G. MORGAN, TN. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, FUNDING
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: IS THE BEP ADEQUATE?, iii (2003).
23. Id.
24. See Verstegen, supra note 21, at 768-76.
25. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ohio 1997) [hereinafter DeRolph I].
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can no longer be funded as a residual.”26 Likewise, the Arkansas high court
admonished:
In order that an amount of funding for an education system based on need and
not on the amount available but on the amount necessary to provide an
adequate education system, the [lower] court concludes an adequacy study is
necessary and must be conducted forthwith.27

Studies of the cost of an adequate education have now been completed in about
twenty-four states, often at request of high courts, in an effort to align
resources with state requirements and provide a rational basis for school
finance systems.28
III. HIGH COURT DECISIONS IN THE NEW WAVE OF SCHOOL FINANCE
LITIGATION – BIFURCATED THEORY OF ADEQUACY
School finance litigation is not new. Most scholars would agree it began in
earnest in 1971 with Serrano v. Priest29 in California, followed by the
landmark federal case San Antonio v. Rodriguez.30 The Serrano Court
employed an equal protection analysis in examining the plaintiffs’ equity
challenge to the constitutionality of the U.S. and California Constitutions.31 In
overturning the funding system, the court held education to be a fundamental
right, and poor children to be a suspect classification. It opined that “affluent
districts can have their cake and eat it too; they can provide a high quality
education for their children while paying lower taxes. Poor districts, by
contrast, have no cake at all.”32 Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Rodriguez found that inequalities in spending among Texas school districts did
not indicate a constitutional violation under the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.33 In a five to four decision, the Court found that a suspect
classification was not implicated and that education was neither explicitly nor
implicitly defined as a fundamental right although the nexus between
education and other rights and liberties afforded protection under the

26. DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1020 (Ohio 2000) [hereinafter DeRolph II].
27. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 486 (Ark. 2002).
28. Molly Hunter, Advocacy Center for Children’s Educational Success with Standards,
Costing-Out, at www.accessednetwork.org. For examples of studies, see DEBORAH A.
VERSTEGEN, THE COUNCIL FOR BETTER EDUCATION, INC., CALCULATION OF THE COST OF AN
ADEQUATE EDUCATION IN KENTUCKY (2003); AUGENBLICK, PALAICH AND ASSOCIATES, INC.,
NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, CALCULATION OF THE COST OF AN
ADEQUATE EDUCATION IN NORTH DAKOTA IN 2002-2003 USING THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
APPROACH (2003).
29. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
30. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244, 1249-66.
32. Id. at 1251-52.
33. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54-55.
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Constitution, i.e., speech and the exercise of the franchise, was asserted by
plaintiffs.34 However, the Court took the opportunity to state that the plaintiffs
had not alleged that the funding system in Texas was inadequate, declaring that
“[e]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either
right, we have no indication that the present levels of education expenditure in
Texas provide an education that falls short.”35 Although the Texas system was
“chaotic and unjust,” the Court found that solutions must come from
lawmakers at the state level and the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.36
Following Rodriguez, most challenges to inequitable state funding systems
moved to state courts, with the 1973 decision Robinson v. Cahill following
quickly in New Jersey. 37 The state high court overturned the funding system
based on the plain meaning of the state constitution’s education clause, which
is the current approach, rather than invoking the Equal Protection Clause.38
The court found that education was neither “thorough nor efficient,” as
required by the constitution.39 In 1976, a second Serrano decision based solely
on the state constitution was forthcoming.40 Again, the funding system was
found unconstitutional, this time based solely on the state constitution.41
Finance litigation proliferated over the decade of the 1970s and early
1980s. At the end of the school finance reform decade, twenty-one high court
decisions were issued — seven in favor of plaintiffs and fourteen for
defendants.42 Analysts have surmised that courts were reluctant to hold
34. Id. at 25, 35-36.
35. Id. at 36-37. For a discussion of federal court challenges, see THE IMPACTS OF
LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION ON SCHOOL FINANCE: ADEQUACY, EQUITY, AND EXCELLENCE
(Julie K. Underwood & Deborah A. Verstegen eds., 1990).
36. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58-59.
37. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
38. Id. at 283, 294.
39. Id. at 295, 297-98.
40. Serrano, 557 P.2d at 951.
41. Id. at 957-58.
42. Between 1973 and 1988 plaintiffs prevailed in New Jersey — Robinson, 303 A.2d at
273; California, Serrano, 557 P.2d at 929; Connecticut — Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359
(Conn. 1977); Washington — Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King County v. Washington, 585 P.2d
71 (Wash. 1978); West Virginia — Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Wyoming —
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); and Arkansas —
Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983). Defendants
prevailed in Arizona — Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Colorado — Lujan v.
Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Georgia — McDaniel v. Thomas, 285
S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Illinois — Blasé v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973); Michigan — Milliken
v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Montana — State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d
776 (Mont. 1974); Idaho — Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Pennsylvania
— Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Ohio — Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of
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finance systems unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause given its
broad reach to all other areas of the Constitution. Then in 1983, finance
reform was eclipsed with education reform: the release of A Nation at Risk hit
a national nerve with its warning about “a rising tide of mediocrity that
threatens our very future as a nation and a people.”43 Overnight education was
front page news as attention turned away from funding, equity, and fairness to
curriculum, testing, pedagogy, standards, and excellence. By 2000, forty-nine
states had adopted curriculum standards that defined what all children should
know and be able to do upon graduation. States also aligned curriculum
standards to performance standards through exams that were intended to
indicate the progress children were making towards state curriculum standards.
School districts, schools, and education officials were held accountable for
results, and state policies provided rewards or sanctions. However, noticeably
absent were resource standards that would assure that all districts and all
students would have equal opportunity to learn the material they would be held
accountable for under the new state standards.
IV. THREE WAVES OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
Since its emergence almost three and one-half decades ago, school finance
litigation has been so plentiful that some scholars have categorized its history
into three waves.44 The first wave was based on federal challenges to finance
inequalities among schools within a state and the federal Equal Protection
Clause; it lasted from the 1960s to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
Rodriguez in 1973.45 Wave two was characterized by equity challenges to
state constitutions; it began with Robinson in 1973 and ended in 1989 when the
new wave of school finance began.46 Wave three was based on the plain
meaning of state education articles and began with cases in Kentucky (Rose),
Texas (Edgewood), and Montana (Helena), and continues to the present.47 The
emphasis is on equal opportunities to a certain quality of education. Reliance
on the education article of state constitutions has fewer implications for other

Cincinnati v. Walker, 390 N.E. 813 (Ohio 1979); Maryland — Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd.
of Educ., 458A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Oklahoma — Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746
P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); New York — Bd. of Educ. Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist,
439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); North Carolina — Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357
S.E.2d 4323 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); and South Carolina — Richland County v. Campbell, 364
S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988).
43. National Commission on Excellence in Education, A NATION AT RISK (1983), available
at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html.
44. Thro, supra note 12, at 222 (advancing the notion of three waves of litigation and
discussing the first cases decided in the new wave of litigation).
45. Id. at 222-24.
46. Id. at 228-33.
47. Id. at 233-38.
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areas of law, unlike Equal Protection Clause arguments, and makes plaintiff
victories more likely.48
In examining the full gamut of high court decisions handed down since the
emergence of the “new wave” of school finance litigation, one is struck by the
prominence of adequacy issues, although equity issues continue.49 In large
part these decisions turn on whether a finance system provides sufficient
resources for all students to obtain a certain level or standard of education that
is constitutionally required. It is important to note that an examination of court
decisions during the third wave of school finance litigation indicates that there
is a bifurcated theory of adequacy emerging from the courts based on how
adequacy is defined.
V. ANTIQUATED DEFINITION OF ADEQUACY – DEFENDANT VICTORIES
In states where the finance system has been upheld, courts appear to be
invoking an age-old minimalist standard of adequacy set down in the 1920s:
because all students had access to a minimum, basic education, the finance
system was not constitutionally infirm despite disparities in educational quality
and financing.50 Significant changes that have occurred in society and the
economy over time appear unacknowledged. However, even these courts have
taken the opportunity to point out that 1) petitioners either have failed to mount
a challenge to the adequacy of the finance system, or 2) petitioners themselves
conceded that the education system was adequate, apparently using a “basic
minimum” standard.51
For example, the Virginia Supreme Court found that education was a
fundamental right but upheld the inequitable finance plan, stating, in part, that
“the Constitution guarantees only that the [state minimum] Standards of
Quality be met” and the “students do not contend that the manner of funding
prevents their schools from meeting” these standards.52 In a split Minnesota
decision, the court stated: “this case never involved a challenge to the
adequacy of education in Minnesota” and that even the plaintiffs conceded that
the system was adequate apparently using a minimalist definition.53 Likewise,
Wisconsin’s high court, upholding the finance plan, stated that “[o]ur
deference would abruptly cease should the legislature determine that it was
‘impracticable’ to provide to each student a right to attend a public school at
which a basic education could be obtained, or if funds were discriminatorily
48. Id. at 241. See also Verstegen, supra note 6, at 243-50; Wayne Buchanan & Deborah A.
Verstegen, School Finance Litigation in Montana, 66 ED. L. REP. 19, 29, 32 (1991).
49. Cf., Verstegen, supra note 6, at 243-50; Thro, supra note 12, at 598 n.4.
50. Deborah A. Verstegen, Equal Education Under the Law: School Finance Reform and the
Courts, 14 J.L. & POL. 555, 575 (1998).
51. Id.
52. Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d. 138, 140, 142 (Va. 1994).
53. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Minn. 1993) (emphasis in the original).
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disbursed and there was no rational basis for such a finance system.”54 In
Maine, the supreme court upheld the state finance system, noting that plaintiffs
“presented no evidence at trial that any disparities in funding resulted in their
students receiving an inadequate education.” 55 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, in upholding the state aid system, noted that all children received
instruction in the minimum “basic-education program, and that these subjects
are taught in all schools irrespective of district wealth.”56 The Alaska Supreme
Court upheld the state’s practice of giving a larger share of state money to
regional school districts than to municipal and borough systems.57 However,
the adequacy of the state’s finance system was not challenged. In Illinois,
although the constitution’s education article called for a “high quality” public
education, in a striking departure from current legal thinking, the court ruled
the provision was non-justicable.58
VI. DEFINING ADEQUACY IN LIGHT OF THE TIMES – PLAINTIFF VICTORIES
Where state finance systems have been invalidated by high courts,
adequacy is defined in the context of the information age and a global
economy. In this context, a minimum or basic education is found to be
insufficient and therefore unconstitutional. As the New Jersey court stated:
“what seems sufficient today may be proved inadequate tomorrow.”59
According to the high court in Wyoming, “[t]he definition of a proper
education is not static and necessarily will change” with the times.60 Likewise,
the Vermont high court opined: “Yesterday’s bare essentials are no longer
sufficient to prepare a student to live in today’s global marketplace.”61 The
Massachusetts high court admonished that “[o]ur Constitution, and its
education clause, must be interpreted in accordance with the demands of
modern society or it will be in constant danger of becoming atrophied . . . .”62
In New Hampshire, the state supreme court declared that “a constitutionally
adequate public education is not a static concept removed from the demands of
an evolving world.”63 In Ohio, the high court, in determining whether the

54. Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 582 (Wis. 1989).
55. Sch. Admin. Dist. 1 v. Comm’r, 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me. 1994).
56. Pawtucket v. Sundlan, 662 A.2d 40, 63 (R.I. 1995).
57. Matanuska-Sustna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 400 (Alaska 1997).
58. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996).
59. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 367 (N.J. 1990) (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d
129, 133 (N.J. 1976)).
60. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1274 (Wyo. 1995).
61. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 396-97 (Vt. 1997).
62. McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993) (quoting
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978)).
63. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997).
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funding system was “thorough and efficient” under the education article of the
state constitution, opined:
The definition of “thorough and efficient” is not static; it depends on one’s
frame of reference. What was deemed thorough and efficient when the state’s
constitution was adopted certainly would not be considered thorough and
efficient today. Likewise, an education system that was considered thorough
and efficient twenty-five years ago may not be so today.64

Similarly, the New York high court admonished that “the definition of a sound
basic education must serve the future . . . .”65
Using a contemporary standard, the New Jersey court held that an adequate
education would equip all children to be “citizens and competitors” in the
labor market.66 It would require equal opportunities to learn including “course
offerings resulting in such intangibles as good citizenship, cultural
appreciation, and community awareness.”67 This would require funding equity
approximating one hundred percent between poor and wealthy school districts,
the court stated, with imbalances favoring the needy.68
In Kentucky, the supreme court accepted the trial court’s statement that an
“efficient” system of education must be uniform, adequate, and unitary.69 An
adequate education was defined by the court as providing each child with
facility in certain essential competencies.70 An adequate education system,
according to the lower courts in Ohio and Alabama and the high courts in
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Arkansas, also sought to
ensure each student the “essential competencies” cited in Kentucky, including
“sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable [him or her] to
compete favorably with counterparts in surrounding states.”71 To this, the
Alabama Supreme Court added “across the nation, and throughout the world in
academics or in the job market.”72

64. DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1001.
65. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 349 (N.Y. 2003).
66. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 374 (N.J. 1990).
67. For a discussion, see Charles S. Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in
Texas, New Jersey and Kentucky, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 401, 414 (1991) (quoting Abbott, 575
A.2d at 397).
68. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 408.
69. Rose v. Council of Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
70. Id.
71. Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, No. DV-90-223-R, WL 204083 at *53 (Ala. Civ.
App. April 1, 1993); DeRolph v. State, No. 93-22043, slip op. at 460-61 (Ct. of C.P., July 1,
1994), aff’d 677 N.E. 733 (Ohio 1997); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 635 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1990); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Lake View Sch. Dist. v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 487-88 (Ark.
2002).
72. Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d 107, 166 (Ala. 1993).
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The mandate emerging from the Massachusetts court in finding the finance
system inequitable, inadequate, and unconstitutional was to provide
opportunities that were available to children in the most affluent school
systems to children in all school systems, rich or poor alike.73 Both a Montana
court and the Texas court concurred by finding that more than a basic
education was constitutionally required and that accreditation standards were
only a foundation upon which a quality education might be built.74 The
Wyoming court, in defining the constitutional command for a “thorough and
efficient system of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all
youth of the state,” 75 underscored that an “equality of quality” was necessary
and achievable through an equitable financing scheme; all differences in
funding must be based on research that verified relevant and justifiable
differences in costs for students or districts with special needs.76 The court
instructed the legislature to define the “proper” education system, cost it out,
and fund it.77 Lack of resources would not suffice as an excuse to fall short, as
the court concluded that, “all other financial considerations must yield until
education is funded.”78
The New Hampshire Supreme Court explained:
Mere competence in the basics — reading, writing, and arithmetic — is
insufficient in the waning days of the twentieth century to insure that this
State’s public school students are fully integrated into the world around them.
A broad exposure to the social, economic, scientific, technological, and
political realities of today’s society is essential for our students to compete,
contribute, and flourish in the twenty-first century.79

The court stated that in “order to deliver a constitutionally adequate public
education to all children, comparable funding must be assured in order that
every school district will have the funds necessary to provide such an
education.”80
In Vermont, although both parties agreed that the finance system (the
Foundation Program) paid for the cost of a “minimum quality” education, the
court found the funding system inadequate and unconstitutional, stating that
“we find no authority for the proposition that discrimination in the distribution
of a constitutionally mandated right such as education may be excused merely

73. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555.
74. Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 692 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989).
75. Campbell County, 907 P.2d at 1263-64 (quoting WYO. CONST. art VII, § 1(9)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1279.
78. Id.
79. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1990).
80. Id. at 1360.
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because a ‘minimal’ level of opportunity is provided to all.”81 The high court
in Ohio held the funding system unconstitutional; it was inadequate to educate
children “to their fullest potential”; it was not even minimally satisfactory.82
The Ohio court also struck down the provisions for facilities and special
education, as did the Wyoming and Alabama courts.83
In Arkansas, finding that equity and adequacy necessarily overlapped, the
high court opined, “[t]here is no question in this court’s mind that the
requirement of a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools
places on the State an absolute duty to provide the school children of Arkansas
with an adequate education.”84 Quoting from a previous decision handed
down almost twenty years prior, the court reiterated, “[f]or some districts to
supply the barest necessities and others to have programs generously endowed
does not meet the requirements of the constitution. Bare and minimal
sufficiency does not translate into equal educational opportunity.”85
Likewise, the New York high court found:
In CFE we equated a sound basic education with “the basic literacy,
calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually
function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a
jury.” We thus indicated that a sound basic education conveys not merely
skills, but skills fashioned to meet a practical goal: meaningful civic
participation in contemporary society . . . . As the Committee on Education
reported at the time, the “public problems confronting the rising generation
will demand accurate knowledge and the highest development of reasoning
power more than ever before.”86

Thus, according to theories emerging from the courts invalidating finance
plans, an adequate education ensures that a child is equipped to participate in
political affairs and compete with his or her peers in the labor market
regardless of circumstances of birth or where that child is educated. An
adequate education “works as well for the least advantaged as it does for the
most advantaged.”87 In these cases, and others like them, what was adequate
was determined in light of the times. Using a contemporary standard, funding
systems that supported a basic minimalist education were found to be
inadequate and therefore unconstitutional. Moreover, as courts in Ohio,
Wyoming, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and other states have pointed out, a
81. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (1997).
82. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 745.
83. Id. at 779; Campbell County, 907 P.2d at 1244; Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt,
No. DV-90-223-R, WL 204093 at *1 (Ala. Civ. App. April 1, 1993).
84. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 493 (Ark. 2002).
85. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark.1983).
86. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 330 (N.Y. 2003) (emphasis in
original) (quoting the documents of 1894 N.Y. Constitutional Convention No. 62, at 4).
87. DeRolph II, 754 N.E.2d at 1244 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
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quality education, in contrast to minimum basic skills, would provide broad
benefits not only to the individual but also to the public at large.88 The New
Jersey court explained:
While the constitutional measure of the educational deficiency is its impact on
the lives of these students, we are also aware of its potential impact on the
entire state and its economy-not only in its social and cultural fabric . . . . So it
is not just that their future depends on the State, the State’s future depends on
them.89

The Supreme Court in New Hampshire concurred by stating: “Education
provides the key to individual opportunities for social and economic
advancement and forms the foundation for our democratic institutions and our
place in the global economy.”90
VII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY: ADEQUATE
OPPORTUNITIES AS MEASURED BY CITIZENSHIP AND THE ABILITY TO COMPETE
Recent state high court rulings have highlighted factual evidence related to
the state funding scheme, constitutional history, and other state contextual
factors. In addition, however, the evidence presented in the “new wave” of
school finance litigation focuses directly on adequacy in the level of
educational opportunities offered to schoolchildren in one or more schools and
districts within a state. This evidence shows that some students are not
receiving a sufficient education as required under the constitution and as
measured by contemporary education standards, state regulations, and/or
comparisons to other school systems (or states). Thus, in assessing the
constitutionality of the finance system, courts have shifted their focus, moving
to include substantive educational content, in addition to dollar disparities and
other educational input, process, and output factors. In essence, they are
interested in determining whether a certain quality of education is available in
all schools and districts and are looking at not only disparities in dollars but in
what dollars buy, including teachers, class sizes, technology, materials,
curriculum, facilities, budget flexibility, and other indicators of adequate
educational opportunities for all children.
For example, the McDuffy Court in Massachusetts cited evidence
indicating that less affluent school districts were offered significantly fewer
educational opportunities and lower educational quality than students in
schools in districts where per pupil spending was among the highest of all
Commonwealth districts.91 These high spending districts, the court stated, “are
88. See generally, e.g., DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 733; Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor,
635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Abbot v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985).
89. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 411-12 (N.J. 1990).
90. Claremont Sch. Dist., 703 A.2d 1353, 1358 (N.H. 1997).
91. McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Mass. 1993).
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able to educate their children,” calling for the state to fulfill its obligation “to
educate all its children.”92 The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) reviewed the
facts in the case, leading to the conclusion that the Commonwealth was in
violation of its constitutional duty to provide all public school students with an
“adequate” education.93 A comparison of four of the sixteen towns and cities
in which plaintiffs lived and attended school (Brockton, Winchedon, Leicester,
and Lowell) were compared to wealthier communities with expenditures in the
top twenty-five percent of school spending in the Commonwealth (Brookline,
Concord, and Wellesley).94 The comparisons showed disadvantages for the
poorer schools.95 Inadequacies in these districts resulted in fewer educational
opportunities and lower educational quality.96
Poor districts, the Massachusetts high court noted, had inferior educational
programs and conditions including: crowded classes; reductions in staff;
inadequate teaching of basic subjects including reading, writing, science, social
studies, mathematics, computers, and other areas; neglected libraries; the
inability to attract and retain high quality teachers; the lack of teacher training;
the lack of curriculum development; the lack of predictable funding;
administrative reductions; and inadequate guidance counseling.97 In contrast,
wealthy districts were characterized by multifaceted reading programs,
extensive writing programs and resources, thorough computer instruction,
active curriculum development and review ensuring a comprehensive and
up-to-date curriculum, extensive teacher training and development,
comprehensive system-wide student services, and a wide variety of courses in
visual and performing arts.98 Funding levels in plaintiff schools were
“substantially less” than the financial resources of public schools in other
towns and cities in the Commonwealth; so low as to render poor localities
“unable to provide students with the opportunity to receive an adequate
education.”99 The plaintiffs claimed the state funding system was responsible
for “wide disparities” and the insufficiencies in education support, a finding of
the SJC.100
The Tennessee high court, finding inadequacy and inequity in the school
finance system, invalidated the finance plan by citing testimony that schools in
poorer districts often have “decaying physical plants, some school buildings
are not adequately heated” and that textbooks and libraries are “inadequate,
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 553.
Id. at 519-23.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 553.
McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 553.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 553-54.
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outdated, and in disrepair.”101 Lack of funds prevented poor schools from
“offering advanced placement courses, more than one foreign language at a
high school, state-mandated art and music classes, drama instruction, and
extracurricular athletic teams . . . .”102 In addition, some schools did not
provide adequate science laboratories, in which “the teachers buy supplies with
their own money to stock the labs, . . . [or] schools engage in almost constant
fundraising by students to provide the needed materials.”103
In addition, in wealthier Tennessee school districts, sixty-six percent of the
elementary schools and seventy-seven percent of the secondary schools were
accredited, compared to seven percent and forty percent among the ten poorest
districts.104 All of the schools in wealthy Kingsport and Shelby County
districts were accredited.105 In contrast, none of the schools in poor Clay,
Wayne, Hancock, and Crockett Counties were accredited.106 Students
attending the unaccredited schools had a higher need for remedial courses at
college, the court pointed out, “resulting in poorer chances for higher
education.”107 This resulted in a “vicious cycle” where poor districts without
accreditation could not recruit new industry and related business to the area.108
Without additions to the tax base provided by new industry, the tax base would
continue to decline, further reducing funds available for schools, the court
noted.109 Differences in spending among poor and wealthy districts in
Tennessee varied considerably, as wealthy districts had two times more than
poor districts.110 The court found “a direct correlation between dollars
expended and the quality of education a student receives.”111
In Vermont, holding the finance system unconstitutional, the high court
found that school districts of equal size but unequal funding would not have
the capacity to offer “equivalent foreign language training, purchase equivalent
computer technology, hire teachers and other professional personnel of
equivalent training and experience, or to provide equivalent salaries and
benefits.”112 Taking aim directly at the property tax as both a revenue source
and mainstay of fiscal disparity, the Vermont Supreme Court invalidated the
finance system, stating that local fiscal choice for poor districts was “illusory,”

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Tennesee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 145 (Tenn. 1993).
Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Tennessee Small Sch., 851 S.W.2d at 144.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 143.
Tennessee Small Sch., 851 S.W.2d at 141.
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997).
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especially as “nowhere [does the constitution state] that the revenue for
education must be raised locally, that the source of the revenue must be
property taxes . . . .”113
In holding the Ohio finance system unconstitutional, the high court stated
“we find that exhaustive evidence was presented to establish that the appellant
school districts were starved for funds, lacked teachers, buildings, and
equipment, and had inferior educational programs, and that their pupils were
being deprived of educational opportunity.”114 Testimony cited in the opinion
revealed that under the school funding system, the amount of money that
supported Ohio schools bore no relationship to the actual cost of educating a
student. New Jersey’s high court and the Wyoming high court have come to
the same conclusion.115 A substantial part of the opinion addressed the
appalling condition of Ohio’s school facilities, including accommodations for
children with disabilities.116
Citing the “dirty, depressing” conditions of the schools that young children
attended, the Ohio high court also reviewed evidence of the unsafe conditions
that existed in the schools.117 For example, in one school district “three
hundred students were hospitalized because carbon monoxide leaked out of
heaters and furnaces.”118 Asbestos was present in 68.6 percent of Ohio’s
school buildings, and “a scant thirty percent” had adequate fire alarm systems
and exterior doors.119 There were leaking roofs, outdated sewage systems that
caused raw sewage to flow onto the baseball field, and arsenic in the drinking
water of certain schools.120 In other schools, “cockroaches crawled on the
restroom floors,” and “plaster was falling off of the walls.”121 “Only twenty
percent of the buildings had satisfactory handicapped access.”122 For example,
the court noted:
Deering Elementary is not handicapped accessible. The library is a former
storage area located in the basement. Handicapped students have to be carried
there and to other locations in the building. One handicapped third-grader at
Deering had never been to the school library because it was inaccessible to
someone in a wheelchair.123

113. Id. at 395, 397.
114. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 742.
115. Id. at 759; Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 433 (N.J. 1997); Campbell County Sch. Dist.
v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1275 (Wyo. 1995).
116. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 742-44.
117. Id. at 743-44.
118. Id. at 743.
119. Id. at 742-43.
120. Id. at 743.
121. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 744.
122. Id. at 742.
123. Id. at 743.
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In Texas, the high court thrice invalidated the system in less than twentyeight months.124 In the initial Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby
decision, the court pointed out the gross disparities that existed among school
districts in the state and found that educational programs in poor districts were
not only inferior to wealthy districts, many did not even meet minimum state
standards.125 For example, “San Elizario I.S.D. [Independent School District]
offer[ed] no foreign language, no pre-kindergarten program, no chemistry, no
physics, no calculus and no college preparatory or honors program.”126 Its
extracurricular programs were almost nonexistent as it had no band, debate, or
football.127 On the other hand, the court said:
High wealth districts are able to provide for their students broader educational
experiences including more extensive curricula, more up-to-date technological
equipment, better libraries and library personnel, teacher aides, counseling
services, lower student-teacher ratios, better facilities, parental involvement
programs, and drop-out prevention programs. They are also better able to
attract and retain experienced teachers and administrators.128

In Kentucky, the high court dramatically extended the reach of school
finance litigation and found the entire education system unconstitutional, not
only the finance system, including the statutes creating, implementing,
governing, and financing the system and all regulations.129 Experts testified
that “without exception . . . there is great disparity between the poor and more
affluent school districts with regard to . . . basic educational materials;
student-teacher ratio; curriculum; quality of basic management; size, adequacy
and condition of physical plant.”130 They found “a definite correlation
between the amount of money spent per child on education and the quality of
education received,” which was corroborated by evidence.131 Variations
among poor and rich districts were found in finances, taxable property,
curriculum (especially foreign language, science, mathematics, music, and art),
test scores, and student teacher ratios.132 Not only did poorer districts provide
an inadequate education, when judged by “accepted national standards,” the
more affluent districts’ efforts were found to be inadequate as well.133

124. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d
489, 515 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1991);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
125. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
126. Id. at 393.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 214 (Ky. 1989).
130. Id. at 198.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 197.
133. Id. at 198.
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Comparisons of Kentucky with adjacent states — Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Missouri, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia — included rankings on per
pupil expenditures, average annual salary of instructional staff, classroom
teacher compensation, property tax revenue as a percent of total revenue,
percentage of ninth grade students graduating from high school, pupil-teacher
ratio, and ACT scholastic achievement test scores.134 The data showed
Kentucky ranked nationally in the lower twenty to twenty-five percent in
virtually every category that was used to evaluate educational performance and
did not provide uniform opportunities among the school districts.135 Thus, the
court found the system inadequate and unconstitutional for all districts, both
rich and poor alike.136
In Montana, the high court struck down the finance system based on the
“plain” meaning of the education article of the Montana Constitution, after
reviewing it to determine whether all children had equal access to a quality
education, not a basic or minimum education.137 It found the system
inadequate to this task, noting that the accreditation standards provided only
“minimum standards upon which quality education must be built.”138
Comparisons of similarly sized high and low spending school districts showed
advantages for high spending districts such as “greater budget flexibility to
address educational needs and goals,” in addition to enriched and expanded
curricula, better equipped schools in terms of textbooks, instructional
equipment, audio-visual instructional materials, consumable materials and
supplies, computer labs, libraries, and better facilities.139 The evidence
demonstrated that the “wealthier school districts are not funding frills . . . ,”
and disparities could not be described as the result of local control.140 In fact,
the present system “may be said to deny to poorer school districts a significant
level of local control, because they have fewer options due to fewer
resources.”141
In New Jersey, the court has struck down the finance system seven times
since 1985, not in total, but for the poor, urban districts only. 142 In the second
134. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 215.
137. See Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 689-90 (Mont. 1989), opinion
amended by 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990).
138. Id. at 691-92.
139. Id. at 686-88.
140. Id. at 690.
141. Id.
142. See Abbott v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842, 845 (N.J. 2002) [hereinafter Abbott VII] (finding
that the mandates set out in Abbott V and Abbott VI had not been met, and setting forth objectives
and dates concerning preschool programs); Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82, 85 (N.J. 2000)
[hereinafter Abbott VI] (clarifying further the requirements dealing with preschool programs in
the poor urban school districts in order to provde an efficient and thorough education); Abbott v.
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ruling (Abbott II), the court noted that poorer urban districts, in contrast to
more affluent localities, were found to have inferior course offerings,
dilapidated facilities, greater student needs, higher drop-out rates, lower
educational expenditures, and failing scores on the High School Proficiency
Test (HSPT).143 Thus, the high court found that the poorer the district, the
greater its need, the less the money available, and the worse the education.144
The New Jersey court held that a thorough and efficient education means more
than teaching the basic skills needed to compete in the labor market, although
this was important.145 It means being able to fulfill one’s role as a citizen and
to participate fully in society, in the life of one’s community, and to appreciate
art, music, and literature.146 As the court stated, “[i]f absolute equality were
the constitutional mandate, and ‘basic skills’ sufficient to achieve that
mandate, there would be little short of a revolution in the suburban districts
when parents learned that basic skills is what their children were entitled to,
limited to, and no more.”147 The opinion cited disparities in education
curricula that were linked to local district wealth and spending.148 For
instance, affluent Princeton had one computer per eight children, but poor
Camden had one computer per fifty-eight children.149 Princeton had seven
science laboratories in its high school, each with built-in equipment; but some
poor urban districts offered science in labs built in the 1920s or 1930s; others

Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 454 (N.J. 1998) [hereinafter Abbott V] (explaining the remedial measures
that must be implemented in public education funding in order to ensure that public school
children from the poorest urban communities receive the educational entitlements that the
Constitution guarantees them); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 420-21 (N.J. 1997) [hereinafter
Abbott IV] (finding public education financing legislation facially constitutional in its adoption of
substantive educational standards, but unconstitutional as applied to districts located in poor
urban areas because funding was not guaranteed); Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 576 (N.J.
1994) [hereinafter Abbott III] (declaring Quality Education Act of 1990 unconstitutional as
applied to districts located in poor urban areas, or special needs districts, and the more affluent
districts); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990) [hereinafter Abbott II] (holding the
Public School Education Act of 1975 unconstitutional and finding that the state must guarantee
funding of education in poorer urban districts at the level of property-rich districts, that such
funding must be guaranteed and mandated by the state, and that the level of funding must also be
adequate to provide for the special educational needs of those poorer urban districts in order to
redress their extreme disadvantages); Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 381 (N.J. 1985) (remanding
challenge to public school funding scheme to administrative tribunal for consideration and
development of an administrative record sufficient to guide the adjudication of the constitutional
issues on any future appeal).
143. See Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 375, 383, 395-97, 400-01.
144. Id. at 363.
145. Id. at 397.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 397-98.
148. See Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 394.
149. Id. at 395.
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provided no laboratory experience at all or wheeled science materials around
the school on a cart to furnish supplies.150 Montclair’s students began
instruction in French or Spanish at the pre-school level; in Princeton’s
four-year high school, programs were also available in German, Italian,
Russian, and Latin in addition to advanced placement courses.151 In contrast,
many poorer schools did not even offer upper level foreign language courses
and only limited courses were available in high school.152 South Brunswick
offered music classes starting in kindergarten; Montclair began with
preschoolers, and every elementary school had an art classroom and art
teacher.153 In contrast, in 1981 poor Camden eliminated all of its elementary
school music teachers and could only provide “helpers” to teach art.154
Another poor urban school provided an art room in the back of the lunchroom,
and there were no art classrooms at all in East Orange elementary schools.155
Many richer suburban school districts had flourishing gymnastics,
swimming, basketball, baseball, soccer, lacrosse, field hockey, tennis, and golf
teams with fields, courts, pools, lockers, showers, and gymnasiums, but in East
Orange the track team practiced in the second floor hallway, and there were no
sports facilities.156 Many district elementary schools did not have a cafeteria or
suitable place to eat lunch.157 Facilities in poor urban districts were often in
disrepair, overcrowded, unsafe, and threatened the safety of children.158
However, most schools in wealthy localities were newer, cleaner, and safer.
For example, in East Orange, thirteen schools needed asbestos removal or
containment; thirteen required structural system repairs; and fifteen had
heating, ventilation, or air conditioning problems.159 Moreover, poor urban
districts were crowded. In Patterson, children ate lunch in a small area in the
boiler room of the basement; remedial classes were taught in a former
bathroom.160 A school in East Orange had no cafeteria, and the children ate
lunch in shifts in the first floor corridor while one class was held in a converted
coal bin.161 The court ordered funding parity between poor urban and wealthy
suburban districts with additional funds for the special needs of Abbott’s urban
schoolchildren.162
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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Id. at 396.
Id.
Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 396.
Id.
Id. at 397.
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Id. at 410.
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In the 1997 Abbott IV litigation, the court underscored the importance of
sufficient funding, again ordering parity between poor urban and wealthy
suburban districts in addition to a study of supplemental programmatic and
facilities needs of urban schools.163 Of the Comprehensive Improvement and
Financing Act (CEIFA), enacted in 1996 to address the issues, it stated:
CEIFA fails to address the estimated ‘$6 billion’ facilities needs . . . . Such a
failure is of constitutional significance - we cannot expect disadvantaged
children to achieve when they are relegated to buildings that are unsafe and
often incapable of housing the very programs needed to educate them.164

The New Jersey high court also ordered a full complement of “supplemental
programs . . . to reverse the educational disadvantage these children start out
with,” including well planned, high quality preschool education for all three
and four year old children in the Abbott urban districts.165 These must be
adequately funded by the state, the court declared.166
In Arizona, the high court reviewed and found the capital outlay provisions
of the state finance system to be unconstitutional.167 According to the facts
presented in the case, facilities varied enormously across the state and were
directly proportional to the value of real property within the district —
including commercial property and power plants.168 For example, the high
court stated:
There are disparities in the number of schools, their condition, their age, and
the quality of classrooms and equipment. Some districts have schoolhouses
that are unsafe, unhealthy and in violation of building, fire and safety codes.
Some districts use dirt lots for playgrounds. There are schools without
libraries, science laboratories, computer rooms, art programs, gymnasiums,
and auditoriums. But in other districts, there are schools with indoor
swimming pools, a domed stadium, science laboratories, television studios,
well stocked libraries, satellite dishes, and extensive computer systems.169

163. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 439-40.
164. Id. at 438. In Abbott V, the court substantially accepted the state’s plan for improving
urban schools. Abbott V, 710 A2d at 512. Also, in Abbott VII the New Jersey Supreme Court in
May of 2000 found that the state must fully fund all facilities improvements and new construction
in Abbott districts. Abbott VII, 751 A.2d at 1035. For a discussion see Margaret E. Goertz, New
Jersey School Finance in the New Millenium, in SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION ACROSS THE
STATES: AN UPDATE 6 (Deborah A. Verstegen ed., 2001), available at ERIC,
http://www.eric.ed.gov/.
165. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 436.
166. Id. at 439-40.
167. Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815-16 (Ariz. 1994).
168. Id. at 809.
169. Id. at 808.
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Facility disparities, the court pointed out, resulted from heavy reliance on
local property tax revenues which also varied enormously across the state.170
For instance, the assessed value of Ruth Fisher Elementary School District,
with the highest valuation per pupil in the state, was $5.8 million.171 In San
Carlos Unified District, the poorest, it was $749.172 Moreover, a property-poor
district with a high tax rate could generate less revenue than a property rich
district with a low tax rate.173
In Arkansas, finding the finance system inequitable, inadequate, and
unconstitutional, the high court recounted Arkansas’s “abysmal rankings in
certain key areas respecting education” and noted that the state “ranks fiftieth
among the states in per capita state and local government expenditures for
elementary and secondary education . . . [and] between forty-ninth and fiftieth
among the states in teachers pay.”174 In addition, there were serious disparities
in teachers salaries and “poor districts with the most ill-prepared students
[were] losing their teachers due to low pay.”175 Citing a “few examples” of
conditions in schools, the high court noted that in Lake View School District,
where ninety-four percent of the students recieved free and reduced price
lunches:
[there is] one uncertified mathematics teacher who teaches all high school
mathematics courses. He is paid $10,000 a year as a substitute teacher and
works a second job as a school bus driver, earning $5,000 a year. He has an
insufficient number of calculators, too few electrical outlets, no compasses and
one chalkboard, a computer lacking software and a printer that does not work,
an inadequate supply of paper, and a duplicating machine that is
overworked . . . . The college remediation rate for Lake View is 100%.176

The court further noted that Holly Grove School District offered no
advanced courses.177 The buildings had both leaky roofs and restrooms in need
of repair.178 The Barton Elementary School had two bathrooms with four stalls
for over 100 students, and Lee County Schools had no advanced placement
classes, school buildings in need of repair, school buses that did not meet state
standards, and only thirty computers for 600 students.179
In New York, the high court found the finance system unconstitutional and
asked whether insufficient funding led to inadequate inputs and therefore
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 815.
Id. at 809.
Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 809.
Id.
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 488 (Ark. 2002).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490.
Id.
Lake View, 91 S.W.3d at 490.
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unsatisfactory results.180 The answer was affirmative.181 As the court held,
“considering all of the inputs, we conclude . . . New York City schools are
inadequate. . . . [T]ens of thousands of students are placed in overcrowded
classrooms, taught by unqualified teachers, and provided with inadequate
facilities and equipment. The number of children in these straits is large
enough to represent a systemic failure.”182
The CFE Court reviewed resource inputs and outputs including teaching,
facilities, and instrumentalities of learning.183 The court found the most
important factor to be teaching, as measured by certification rates, test results,
experience levels, and the ratings teachers receive from their principals.184
There was a “mismatch between need in New York City and the quality of the
teaching directed to that need . . . . Uncertified or inexperienced teachers tend
to be concentrated in the lowest performing schools . . ., and the longer
students are exposed to good or bad teachers, the better or worse they
perform.”185 In New York City, eighty-four percent of the student population
were minority children, most of whom were poor, but of the teaching force;
seventeen percent were either uncertified or taught in an area other than those
in which they were certified.186 New York City also had the largest percentage
of teachers with only two or fewer years experience, e.g., novices, and the
teachers had high failure rates on the certification exam. For example, more
than forty percent had failed math.187 Further, the city schools could neither
attract nor retain quality teachers, and the court noted “the quality of the
teaching correlates with student performance.”188
In addition, thirty-one city high schools serving over 16,000 students had
no science laboratory, and the court found that there was an “encroachment” of
ordinary classroom activities on other specialized spaces such as libraries,
laboratories, and auditoriums.189 Schools had “excessive class sizes,” which
“affects learning,” and over half of New York City schoolchildren were in
classes of twenty-six or more, while “tens of thousands are in classes of over
30.”190 Instrumentalities of learning were also deficient, as library books that
were “old and not integrated with contemporary curricula,” city schools had

180.
CFE].
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 336 (N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter
Id.
Id.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 333.
CFE, 801 N.E.2d at 333-34.
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half as many computers as in other New York schools, and the computers were
“aging . . . [and] in some cases, simply cannot support presently-available
software.”191
The defendants argued in part that high drop out rates and low test scores
in city schools resulted from students’ low socio-economic status and were
independent of the quality of the schools. However, the court held that “we
cannot accept the premise that children come to New York City schools
ineducable, unfit to learn.”192 The high court admonished, “[a]s the trial court
correctly observed, this opportunity [for a sound basic education] must still ‘be
placed within reach of all students,’ including those who present with socioeconomic deficits.”193
VIII. DEFINING ADEQUACY: SUBSTANTIVE EDUCATION CONTENT,
STANDARDS, AND OTHER RELATED FACTORS
A key approach used by high courts in determining educational adequacy
that meets constitutional muster includes defining substantive education
content as a basis for resource allocations. The Kentucky Supreme Court
accepted a trial court’s statement that an “efficient” educational system, as
required by the constitution, was uniform, adequate, and unitary.194 The court
stated that an adequate system must provide each child with facility in seven
essential competencies.195 These include:
(i)
sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students
to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization;
(ii)
sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to
enable the student to make informed choices;
(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community,
state, and nation;
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness;
(v)
sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate
his or her cultural and historical heritage;

191. Id. at 336.
192. Id. at 341. The court here is commenting on immigrants and declines “to pin the blame”
solely on the deficits a “troubled child” brings with him to school. Id. The court found no proof
that drop out rates result from high numbers of teenage immigrants who enter ninth grade unable
to graduate. Id. Instead, the court determined poor completion rates of high school students in
New York City schools results from learning deficits that begin to be accumulated long before
high school. Id. at 341-42.
193. CFE, 801 N.E.2d at 341-42.
194. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
195. Id.
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(vi)

sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose
and pursue life work intelligently; and
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.196
The lower courts in Ohio and Alabama and the high courts in Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Arkansas197 also found that an adequate education system
sought to ensure each student the “seven essential competencies” cited in
Kentucky, including a “sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to
enable him or her to compete favorably with counterparts in surrounding
states.”198 To this the Alabama court added that each student should be able to
compete favorably not only among surrounding states but also “across the
nation, and throughout the world, in academics or the job market.”199
The Wyoming court in Campbell I underscored that an “equality of
quality” was necessary and was achievable through an equitable financing
scheme.200 The court instructed the legislature to define the “best” educational
system and to identify the proper “package” for each student.201 Thus, the
Wyoming court called for a definitional standard of adequacy based on the
presumption of a quality education for all children across the state.
Importantly, this standard included additional revenue for legitimate and
justifiable educational needs and costs of school districts and students,
reflecting a concern for at-risk children also found in North Carolina, New

196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 487-88 (Ark. 2002).
We concur with the trial court that an efficient system of education must have as its goal
to provide each and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and
rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political
systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of
governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or
vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.
Id.
198. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
199. Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d 107, 108 (Ala. 1993).
200. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995).
201. Id.
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Jersey, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and New York.202 Thus, like other courts,
adequate funding did not require absolute equality in expenditures. The
Campbell I Court, for example, held that a constitutional finance system
required the legislature to take into consideration various balancing factors and
devise a state formula that weighted the calculation to compensate for the
special needs of children and other legitimate educational cost differentials.203
It provided allowances for such variances among individuals, groups, and local
conditions but held that these factors must not be arbitrary but be justifiable,
that is, based on research and studies.204
In striking down the finance system as unconstitutional for poor urban
districts, the New Jersey court in Abbott II called for: (1) the same level of
education funding in poorer urban districts as in property-rich districts, (2)
funding to be independent of the ability of local school districts to tax, (3) the
state to guarantee and mandate such funding, and (4) the level of funding to be
adequate to provide for the special educational needs found in poorer urban
districts.205 In Abbott III, the court clarified that “substantial equivalence
approximating 100 percent” was required between affluent and poor urban
school districts and that additional programs for children in poor urban districts
meant that additional funding was necessary-beyond the average amounts
affluent districts spend and “in addition to those for regular education.”206
Ultimately, the New Jersey court found that a “thorough and efficient”
educational system was one that gave every student “a modicum of variety and
a chance to excel.”207
This approach to reaching a fair, adequate, and constitutional finance
system for poor urban districts was later underscored when the new finance
statute, created in response to the litigation and entitled CEIFA, was also found
unconstitutional due to the lack of a rational basis for quantifying costs used to
fund the Act.208 The court held that neither the per pupil amount provided
under the foundation program, nor the extra assistance for the special needs of
children in poor urban areas, was based on legitimate cost studies that
recognized the differences in needs and funding between wealthy and poor
districts.209 Thus, the financial aspects of the new Act were found wanting and
in need of repair. The interim remedy “we mandate,” the court stated in part,

202. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, while upholding the system, also included in the
constitutional definition of adequacy supplemental services for students with extraordinary needs.
Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 418 (Wis. 2000).
203. Campbell County, 907 P.2d at 1279.
204. See id.
205. See generally Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 359.
206. Abbott IV, 643 A.2d at 577.
207. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 398.
208. Abbott IV, 643 A.2d at 421.
209. Id.
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is the improvement of regular education through increased funding.210 “By the
commencement of the 1997-1998 school year, the State must guarantee that
each SND [special needs district] has the money required to spend at the
[wealthy] DFG I & J average budgeted (as opposed to predicted) per-pupil
expenditure.”211
In April of 1999, the South Carolina Supreme Court, reinstating a school
finance case, declared that all children are entitled to a “minimally adequate”
education establishing a qualitative standard and affirmative duty of the state
toward schooling.212 Defining with “deliberately broad parameters” the
outlines of the constitution’s requirement, the high court mandated that state
must provide safe and adequate facilities in which students will have the
opportunity to acquire: 1) the ability to read, write, and speak the English
language and knowledge of mathematics and physical science; 2) a
fundamental knowledge of economics, social and political systems, and of
history and governmental processes; and 3) academic and vocational skills.213
In North Carolina the high court in Leandro held that unequal funding did
not violate constitutional principles but addressed adequacy directly when it
asked: Does the right to an education have a qualitative content?214 Is the state
required to provide children with an education that meets some minimum
standard?215 The high court answered “yes.”216 “An education that does not
serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in the
society in which they live and work is devoid of substance and is
constitutionally inadequate.”217 Adequacy was defined as providing students
with the essential competencies cited in Kentucky.218
To determine
educational adequacy, the court stated that several factors should be considered
including: educational goals and standards adopted by the legislature, the
achievement of children on standard achievement tests, and per pupil
expenditures, but other factors may be relevant and no single factor may be
treated as absolutely authoritative.219 The case was remanded to the lower
court to determine if the funding and substance of the state educational system
was constitutionally adequate.220

210. Id.
211. Id. at 443.
212. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999).
213. Id. See also Jennifer L. Fogle, Abbeville County School District v. State: The Right of a
Minimally Adequate Education in South Carolina, 51 S.C. L. Rev. 420, 421-22 (2000).
214. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254, 256 (N.C. 1997).
215. Id. at 254.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 255.
219. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d at 259-60.
220. Id. at 259.
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Additionally:
In April 2002, Judge Manning of the Superior Court of Wake County, North
Carolina issued his fourth order in Hoke v. State. Building off of previous
decisions, Judge Manning found that at-risk students could learn with effective
instruction by a competent well-trained teacher. The state argued that
sufficient resources were being provided for at-risk students, but local school
districts were not spending the resources appropriately. Judge Manning
rejected this claim and stated, “it is up to the executive and legislative branches
to provide solutions to the constitutional deficits with at-risk children. These
branches can no longer stand back and point their fingers at individual school
districts.”221

The high court in New York also found that substantive educational
content determined an adequate education when it stated:
the measure of a sound basic education is educational content — the set of
“basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills” children acquire and its fit with
the goal of productive citizenship. Of course, results on a national normreferenced exam may be translatable into a measure of the skills students must
master to have a sound basic education . . . , [but the] State has not shown how
to translate these results into proof that the schools are delivering a sound basic
education, properly defined.222

IX. SUMMARY
The analysis of judicial decisions emerging during the new wave of school
finance litigation indicates that there is a bifurcated concept of adequacy
emerging from the courts. Where school finance systems are upheld, a
minimalist education is considered adequate. When finance systems are
invalidated, the concept of an adequate education goes well beyond a
minimalist educational program that was once considered the acceptable
standard. Today, according to the courts invalidating finance plans, minimums
and basic skills are considered to be inadequate to ensure that all children will
be “citizens and competitors” in an age of information and globalization. Nor
will this minimalist standard of adequacy provide economic and social benefits
to the nation at large, as the New Jersey and New Hampshire high courts have
noted.
The high courts invalidating state finance systems have found that an
adequate education is defined by the “best” system; it is a “quality” system; it
provides “excellence in education”; it equips all children with certain

221. National Center on Education Finance, North Carolina Decision: Recent Activity, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/litigationnc.htm (last viewed Apr. 16, 2004) (citing Hoke
County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95-CVS-1158, at 107-08 (Apr. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.ncjustice.org/edlaw/LeandroIV-FinalJDT.doc).
222. CFE, 801 N.E.2d at 339-40.
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knowledge and competencies that allow them to compete in the labor
market-across the country and internationally as well.
This conclusion has also found overwhelming agreement in the
policymaking community. There, a consensus has emerged on the need to turn
the education system to world class standards aimed at ambitious outcomes for
all children and at all schools, and challenging state curriculum and
performance standards towards these ends have been implemented in fortynine states. However, most states have failed to define resource standards that
ensure that all students in all districts have an equal opportunity to obtain an
adequate education and excel on curriculums and exams for which they are
held accountable. Moreover, as the focus of litigation has spotlighted
adequacy issues while continuing to focus on equity, plaintiffs have more
recently brought suits that go beyond challenging the per-pupil expenditures of
school districts within a state. They have broadened their complaints, calling
into question whether the amount being spent equates to an “adequate”
education and is aligned with a certain level of resources and opportunities
necessary to meet constitutional requirements and state standards for all
children, including children in poverty and at-risk of educational failure.
Resource indicators of adequacy in education include opportunities provided to
children in schools and classrooms, such as the depth and breadth of
curriculum, teacher quality, the ability to attract and retain quality teachers,
facilities needs and safety, class sizes, budget flexibility and stability, and other
input, output, and process indicators. Interestingly courts in New Jersey,
Kentucky, Wyoming, Massachusetts, and other states have ruled in favor of
plaintiffs, finding that the amount of money determined largely by the
foundation formulas used in forty states to fund education and that support a
minimal, basic education, is insufficient, irrational, and therefore
unconstitutional. These courts have vacated earlier notions of minimal
adequacy for basic education while maintaining constructs that do not sever
theories of educational adequacy from educational equity.223 They have
defined adequacy in light of the times through input, output, or definitional
standards, consistent with the federal Constitution.
This suggests that to support the new adequacy in education, finance
systems must be linked to quality programs and services offered to children in
schools and in classrooms, they must provide additional assistance to meet a
child’s legitimate and educationally relevant special learning needs and the
uncontrollably high costs some small, sparse, or large districts experience.

223. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 496 (Ark. 2002)
(stating that “[t]here is no doubt in our minds that there is considerable overlap between the issue
of whether a school-funding system is inadequate and whether it is inequitable. Deficiencies in
certain public schools in certain school districts can sustain a finding of inadequacy but also,
when compared to other schools in other districts, a finding of inequality.”).
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Overall, they must align resources to substantive education content that will
equip a child to be a citizen and competitor in the twenty-first century and
provide a rational basis for financing education for children in America’s
public elementary and secondary schools. They must close the gap between
the best and worst finance system within a state and give to the many what is
reserved to the fortunate few: equal opportunities for an adequate quality
education.
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